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THE COGNITIVE-INITIATIVE ACCOUNT 
OF DEPRESSION-RELATED IMPAIRMENTS 
IN MEMORY 
Paula T. Hertel 
I. Introduction 
The many and diverse interpretations of the word control make it clear 
that control constitutes a fundamental concern in most areas of psychology. 
In an illustration of this diversity, I described my interest in controlled uses 
of memory at a social gathering; my new acquaintances, without realizing 
the non sequitur, subsequently raised issues about self control and loss of 
control-issues much more relevant to their own interests in psychological 
phenomena than are my narrow musings. Yet a second thought devoted 
to the semantics of control reveals underlying commonalities. For example, 
when older people begin to have problems with controlled uses of memory, 
they sometimes feel like they are losing control in a more general sense. 
Consider a related concept: initiative. When it is used in the context of 
research on memory and cognition, it refers to the research participants' 
, use of cognitive procedures that are not specified fully by the constraints 
j of the experimental task (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990). When it is used in 
, an everyday context, however, it suggests an active motivational state or 
: a certain readiness to perform, as in, "She showed excellent initiative in 
organizing the meeting." Yet, as the example illustrates, this everyday 
sense of initiative also sometimes includes the notion that procedures were 
I 1 accomplished without prior specification, that someone has done something 
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they were not directly told to do. Turning the concept of initiative in the 
clinical direction, we easily observe that depressed people do not show 
much of it. The lack of initiative in the everyday sense is understood to be 
a fundamental characteristic of depression. Regardless of their readiness, 
however, people who are in depressed mood states often show deficits in 
initiative in the sense that refers to deficient cognitive control. They have 
difficulty initiating thoughts and actions, or at least the sorts of thoughts 
and actions that happen to produce benefits on routine cognitive tasks. 
My interest in depression-related impairments in remembering was 
brought about by an accidental discovery that experimental control elimi- 
nated such impairments. When attention was well controlled by the de- 
mands of the task, and therefore did not have to be self-controlled, de- 
pressed participants recalled as well as did others. In this chapter, I review 
the lines of research that grew out of this accidental discovery and that my 
colleagues and I have called the cognitive-initiative framework. The reader 
should see that the sense of initiative that we have tried to capture since the 
late 1980s or so refers to the unspecified or uninstructed use of procedures 
("someone has done something they were not directly told to do"). How- 
ever, this approach has occasionally been interpreted in a more broadly 
motivational sense. After reviewing some studies, both old and new, that 
illustrate the framework, the chapter discusses the broader interpretation 
and related approaches. 
11. The Framework and the Findings 
As a general approach for organizing findings of depression-related impair- 
ments in deliberate remembering, the cognitive-initiative framework 
makes three basic claims. First, evidence of impairments should be found 
under conditions in which attention is poorly controlled and cognitive 
procedures loosely constrained. Second, task structures and constraints 
that have been shown to benefit deliberate attempts to remember, when 
employed with participants in depressed and nondepressed states, should 
close the gap otherwise associated with the difference in state. In other 
words, the experimental control of attention-during initial exposure to 
the materials or during the memory test later on-should provide a good 
substitute for self-initiated control. Third, if the criterion task-the one 
that shows effects of prior experience-does not typically invoke deliberate 
remembering, depression-related impairments should not be found. In fact, 
on tasks that are actually disrupted by deliberate attempts to remember, 
depressed participants should fail to show the disruption. This section re- 
views research that supports each of these claims, beginning with the last 
as it plays out in the realm of problem solving. 
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Like the memory literature, the literature on problem solving reveals dif- 
ficulties associated with depressed mood states (see Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). According to most theoretical frameworks, 
these difficulties would be expected to emerge in some types of problem- 
solving tasks, particularly those tasks that require sustained attention to 
systematic steps in hypothesis testing. There is, however, a paradigm for 
studying spontaneous analogical transfer in problem solving that is proce- 
durally similar to many memory paradigms and that has revealed an advan- 
tage to being in a depressed mood. 
Spontaneous analogical transfer is typically studied by presenting logic 
and other kinds of word problems together with their solutions during a 
training phase. The training phase is followed by a transfer phase in which 
analogous problems are presented for solution without mention of the prior 
analogs. The paradigm, therefore, is procedurally similar to indirect tests 
of memory, during which no mention is made of the prior phase of initial 
exposure to materials. This parallel extends to the researchers' interests as 
well, because in both cases we are interested in revealing a benefit of prior 
"training" through its nondeliberate use. With this arrangement, Needham 
and Begg (1991) showed that spontaneous transfer profited from problem- 
oriented training. In the problem-oriented condition, students were asked 
to try to solve each training problem before its solution was explained. 
Students in this condition accurately solved more transfer problems than 
did the students who had been given memory-oriented instructions during 
training-students who tried to learn the training problems and their solu- 
tions for a later test. (In a transfer-appropriate fashion, memory-oriented 
training produced superior recall of the training problems.) 
One possible interpretation of the problem-solving results holds that the 
solutions to the training problems come to mind spontaneously as the 
students are introduced to the corresponding analogical problem structures, 
much in the same way that prior experience influences performance on 
indirect tests of memory. In other words, memory operates in a truly sponta- 
neous or automatic fashion. Alternatively, problem solvers might notice 
similarities between the problem sets and initiate a deliberate and controlled 
search of memory for the appropriate solutions. In other words, memory 
might operate predominately in automatic versus controlled ways to facili- 
tate the solutions to the transfer problems. Knowing the extent to which 
self-initiated, controlled reflection plays a role is important to the consider- 
ation of how well students in depressed or dysphoricl moods should do. 
'To avoid misrepresenting the state of depression, dysphoria is a term used to refer to 
naturally occurring negative affect, as it is measured by such instruments as the Beck Depres- 
sion Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) in the absence of clinical 
diagnosis through structured clinical interviews. 
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Alicia Knoedler and I (Hertel & Knoedler, 1996) predicted that perfor- 
mance of dysphoric students should be impaired if self-initiated reflection 
plays a significant role in the transfer phase. We also reasoned that if 
reflection plays a significant role, everyone (and especially the dysphoric 
students) should be helped by the provision of hints to think back to the 
analogous training problems before they try to solve the corresponding 
transfer problems. If memory is used deliberately and explicitly, cues should 
help. So in experiment 1, problem-oriented training was followed by a 
transfer phase with two conditions. Prior to each analogous transfer prob- 
lem, half of the students-both dysphoric and nondysphoric-were given 
explicit hints to think of the appropriate training problems, whereas the 
other half were told merely to clear their minds and prepare for the next 
problem to solve. 
Much to our surprise, the hints actually disrupted the performance of 
the nondysphoric students, compared to the no-hint controls. After replicat- 
ing this finding, we began to see it as an example of transfer-appropriate 
processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Problem-oriented training 
encouraged an initial focus on the structure of the problem; this focus had 
more in common with the focus in the no-hint condition of the transfer 
phase than it did with the focus in the hint condition. Instructions in the 
hint condition focused attention on the past, and perhaps on details of the 
problems in place of the more abstract relations among their elements. 
Regardless of the reason, the fact that the hints actually hindered perfor- 
mance by nondysphoric problem-solvers argued against self-initiated re- 
flection as the primary way transfer was achieved in the no-hint condition. 
Knoedler and I (1996) concluded that spontaneous transfer in the no-hint 
condition was more likely achieved by the spontaneous use of memory 
than by a self-initiated and deliberate search; the method of solution came 
to mind as the analogous structure was conceived. 
On this view, we would not expect to find a depression-related impair- 
ment in the no-hint groups, and we did not. More surprising (again, and 
replicated) was the finding of a reliable advantage to feeling depressed 
when hints were provided. Figure 1 reproduces the mean percentage of 
problems solved by dysphoric and nondysphoric participants in both condi- 
tions of experiment 1. It is apparent that the dysphoric participants solved 
reliably more problems than the nondysphoric participants when everyone 
was given hints; Knoedler and I surmised that the dysphoric participants did 
not follow instructions to think back and thereby avoided the corresponding 
pitfalls. Now, cases in which controlled reflection disrupts performance are 
probably rare, particularly in the memory investigations that experimental- 
ists tend to emphasize. We do like to imagine situations in which past 
experience is more beneficial if one "goes with the flow" in place of being 
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Fig. 1. The mean percentage of transfer problems solved by dysphoric and nondysphoric 
students who were either given hints to remember the training analogs or told to clear their 
minds in the no-hint condition. From a table in "Solving Problems by Analogy: The Benefits 
and Detriments of Hints and Depressed Moods," by P. T. Hertel and A. J. Knoedler, 1996, 
Memory & Cognition, 107, p. 19. Copyright O 1996 by the Psychonomics Society; adapted 
with permission of the authors. 
more reflective, and in those cases a depressed mood could help us avoid 
the pitfalls of searching our memory in vain. Much more common is the 
situation in which memory operates spontaneously and sometimes without 
awareness. No one tells us to reflect back and no one thinks to do so. 
Successful indirect tests of memory put nondepressed participants on the 
same footing with depressed participants, because neither group shows 
initiative in controlled uses of memory. Indirect tests are carefully designed 
to insure that participants do not deliberately think back to a prior experi- 
mental phase as they are spelling homophones, completing word fragments 
or word stems, or freely associating to cues. Indeed, no differences have 
been found on tests of homophone spelling (Hertel & Hardin, 1990), word 
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completion (Danion et al., 1991; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Watkins, Mathews, 
Williamson, & Fuller, 1992), or free association (Watkins, Vache, Verney, 
Muller, & Mathews, 1996). Yet the extent to which a particular word comes 
to mind to provide a spelling, complete a stem, or relate to a cue should 
also reflect the extent to which that particular word was attended initially. 
The results of one experiment that revealed differences associated with 
depression perhaps did so because the words were poorly attended in the 
first place (Hertel, 1994). 
In that experiment, performed with clinically depressed and nonde- 
pressed participants from the community, two types of rating tasks were 
used in phase 1. In one block the words were rated for their emotional 
value, and in the other block they were rated for the degree of curvature 
in their perceptual form. These rating blocks were followed by a test of 
perceptual identification, in which new words and previously rated words 
were presented very briefly and back-masked; the task was to read the 
words aloud. As anticipated, words previously rated for their emotional 
value were identified more readily than were new words, regardless of the 
mood group. However, the effect of prior exposure in the curvature task 
was reliably smaller in the depressed group than in the nondepressed group. 
Blocking according to the type of rating might have been the key to produc- 
ing this depression-related impairment, because a block of curvature ratings 
could be completed without even noticing what the letters spelled. In other 
words, some of these words might have been read by depressed participants 
for the first time on the test. The focus of attention matters, if merely to 
establish a perceptual record of having read a word. The larger principle 
illustrated by this isolated finding is that procedures across episodes should 
be transfer appropriate if the past is to benefit the present. 
Impaired performance on tests of intentional or deliberate memory typically 
occurs when attention is poorly controlled by external means. The extreme 
"proof" of this claim is the simple demonstration in which a neurologically 
healthy person is constrained to attend to nothing else except the material 
at hand, and then the material is swept away and an instant later the 
request for memory is posed. To the extent that variations in attention are 
introduced-perhaps in the form of a retention interval in which this person 
must attend to other things or perhaps through the introduction of other 
materials that vie for attention-performance on the memory test suffers. 
Performance always relies on the ability of the rememberer to direct atten- 
tion to events that are no longer occurring-events in the past. And perfor- 
mance always benefits from the transfer-appropriate use of attention during 
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initial exposure, which is rarely well arranged, either naturally or experi- 
mentally. Therefore, variations in performance on tests of deliberate re- 
membering are correlated with the extent to which the rememberer initiates 
beneficial procedures without being constrained to do so by the demands 
of the task. Initiative is important in an unplanned world. 
1. On Tests of Free Recall 
Stephanie Rude and I accidentally discovered that initiative is important 
to the understanding of memory in depressed states when we tried to 
replicate some results obtained by Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez (1984). 
Ellis et al. experimentally induced sad or neutral moods, and then presented 
the students with a semantic orienting task followed by a surprise test of 
free recall. The orienting task was to judge whether a target word fit 
meaningfully in a corresponding sentence frame. The frames established 
more or less difficult or distinctive contexts for the words to be recalled; 
distinctiveness benefited target recall by participants in a neutral mood, 
but not by those in a sad mood. Another way of looking at the results 
revealed that the students in a sad mood recalled fewer words from the 
more distinctive contexts than did the students in a neutral mood. In a 
prior study (Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979), the more distinctive 
frames, compared to the less distinctive ones, had also produced longer 
latencies on a secondary task intended to measure cognitive effort, or the 
amount of attentional resources expended in judging whether the words 
fit into the frames. Therefore, Ellis et al. concluded that the students induced 
to feel sad had insufficient resources available to encode the target words 
in those frames. They also generalized these results to depressed people, 
and Rude thought the justification for this generalization was worth investi- 
gating. Judging the fit of words like "artist" in sentences such as "The 
young man's physique was admired by the " did not seem 
too effortful for even a depressed person to do. 
Our first study (Hertel & Rude, 1991b, experiment 1; Rude & Hertel, 
1987) revealed quite the opposite pattern to what Ellis et al. found. Naturally 
dysphoric students actually recalled more words from both types of frames 
than did the students who were not dysphoric. Although we speculated 
about why they performed better (why the finding might have been real 
instead of a type-I error), the more important point was that they did not 
perform worse than the nondysphoric participants. This result led us to 
consider the methodological differences between the two experiments, 
other than the nature of participants' moods. The main differences were 
that Rude and I had required participants to repeat the target word at the 
end of each trial and then report whether it fit the frame, whereas Ellis et 
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al. (1984) did not require repetition and had accepted the judgment of fit 
at any point during the trial. These differences were incorporated into the 
design of subsequent experiments, as was the variation in the type of mood 
(naturally occurring versus experimentally induced). We replicated the 
recall deficit found by Ellis et al. when we used their method and eliminated 
it when we used our own. Later, we extended our findings to clinically 
depressed outpatients, nondepressed outpatients, and outpatients recov- 
ered from depressive episodes (Hertel & Rude, 1991a). The mean percent- 
ages of words recalled from the more distinctive frames are shown in Fig. 
2. The figure illustrates the point that depressed people have sufficient 
"resources" to attend in ways that benefit subsequent recall. What matters 
is how that attention is controlled. The focused condition of initial exposure 
required participants to keep each word in mind for the duration of the 
8-s trial in order to repeat it; this procedure also might have encouraged 
additional attention to the contextual frame and a more distinctive record 
for retrieval. The unfocused condition permitted such episodic enrichment, 
but at the behest of self-sustained attention. It was possible to think about 
other matters or not think at all. In short, there was room for initiative in 
the focus of attention. Again, the focus of attention matters, this time to 
establish a richer basis for deliberate retrieval. 
2. On Tests of Recognition 
So far, it seems that tests that require deliberate retrieval are most sensitive 
to prior variations in cognitive initiative and corresponding depression- 
related impairments, whereas tests that do not-indirect or implicit tests- 
are least sensitive. One might imagine that recognition tests fall somewhere 
in the middle, given that they typically invoke a mixture of controlled and 
automatic retrieval processes (see Jacoby, 1991). Controlled judgments of 
prior occurrence can be based on a deliberate consideration of the prior 
context of the test items. Automatic influences can also guide recognition 
judgments; items are perceived or conceived more fluently the second time 
around (on the test), and that fluency is experienced as familiarity (see 
Jacoby, Kelly, & Dywan, 1989). Most likely, both controlled and automatic 
uses of the past are invoked on most recognition tests. However, probably 
because recognition tests can be performed by relying on more automatic 
processes, depression-related impairments are rarely observed. Therefore, 
to reveal possible impairments in the controlled component alone, 
Stephanie Milan and I used Jacoby's (1991) process-dissociation procedure 
for recognition (Hertel & Milan, 1994). 
We presented essentially unrelated pairs of words during phase 1 and 
asked dysphoric and nondysphoric students to judge their relatedness. In 
Mood Group 
0 Nondepressed Recovered 
Depressed i 
- 
Unfocused Focused 
Phase 1 Condition 
Fig. 2. The mean percentage of words recalled from the more distinctive sentence frames 
presented in phase 1. Participants were clinically depressed, recovered from episodes of 
depression, or nondepressed controls. Their attention to the experimental materials in phase 
1 was either unfocused or focused by the demands of the task. From a table in "Depressive 
Deficits in Memory: Focusing Attention Improves Subsequent Recall," by P. T. Hertel and 
S. S. Rude, 1991, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 120, p. 304. Copyright 0 1991 
by the American Psychological Association and adapted with permission of the authors. 
phase 2, they listened to single words on audio tape and tried to remember 
them for a later test. Then the recognition test was performed on the first 
members of the pairs in phase 1, the single words from phase 2, and words 
not previously presented. On half the trials (inclusion) the participants 
were instructed to call the words old regardless of whether they thought 
they had occurred in phase 1 or 2; they could make this judgment either 
on the basis of controlled recollection or on familiarity in the absence of 
control. On the other half (exclusion), they were instructed to call only 
56 Paula T. Hertel 
words from phase 2 old; phase-1 words should be excluded. By assuming that 
the two bases of recognition judgments were inde~endent ,~  we computed 
estimates of each component and used those estimates as the dependent 
variables in separate analyses. The estimates of the controlled, recollective 
component of recognition memory were reliably lower in the dysphoric 
group than in the nondysphoric group, but the estimates of the automatic 
component of familiarity were similar. 
Unlike the situation with free recall, in which participants have little 
recourse when they cannot reflectively attend (other than to guess, of 
course), oldlnew recognition decisions can be made without going to a lot of 
trouble to think back. By using a process-dissociation procedure, however, 
Milan and I were able to show that the flexibility in how recognition is 
performed allowed room for initiative in cognitive control. (Exclusion in- 
structions can be taken with a grain of salt if one finds it difficult to conjure 
up prior contexts.) We also thought that if we could constrain attention 
better in this testing situation, we might be able to close the dysphoria- 
related gap in the estimates of control. Therefore, in another condition of 
the test, pairs of words were presented. These pairs were presented intact 
from phase 1, or they were phase-2 words paired with new words, or they 
were pairs of entirely new words. We instructed participants in the paired 
condition that the second member of the pair could help them make the 
recognition decision. In effect, we were giving them a basis for source 
monitoring on exclusion trials, becuase if the second member of the pair 
also seemed old they could be more certain that the first member of the 
pair came from phase 1 and should be excluded. 
The contextual support helped, of course. Compared to the single-item 
test, the paired test raised estimates of the automatic component for every- 
one; greater fluency from the replicated partners made the target words 
feel more familiar. The paired test also provided everyone with a better 
basis of controlled reflection, dysphoric and nondysphoric participants alike. 
Thus, we failed to even partly alleviate the dysphoric participants' deficiency 
in controlled recollection. One possible reason was that the source- 
monitoring stratey was not guided on a trial-by-trial basis. Another possible 
reason was that 6 s were allotted for each relatedness judgment in phase 
Jacoby's equation to represent the probability of (correctly) endorsing a phase-1 word 
on inclusion trials captures the assumption of independent controlled and automatic pro- 
cesses: P ( ~ l d i , , ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ )  = C + (1 - C )  A, where C equals the probability of controlled 
recollection and A equals the probability of automatic influences. The equation to repre- 
sent the probability of (erroneously) endorsing a phase-1 word on exclusion trials is: 
P (~ld,,,~~,,~,) = (1 - C) A. By subtracting the second equation from the first-in practice, 
by subtracting the proportion of erroneously endorsed phase-1 words during exclusion from 
the proportion of correctly endorsed phase-1 words during inclusion-estimates of controlled 
recollection are obtained for each participant. 
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1-enough time to produce variation in attention during initial exposure 
to the pairs and consequently variable bases for controlled reflection. 
In a much earlier series of recognition experiments that relied on source 
monitoring in a different way, Tammy Hardin and I were more successful in 
closing the dysphoria gap (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). We obtained stochastic 
independence between performance on an indirect test of homophone 
spelling and performance on a subsequent recognition test, but only when 
participants were dysphoric. The nondysphoric students' responses on the 
two tests were correlated. They seemed to use the strategy of checking 
memory for how they had spelled the word on the indirect test and then 
asked themselves if that word (e.g., "pear" instead of "pair") had been 
presented in the first phase. (The first phase posed questions such as, "What 
color is a pear?") We led all participants through the steps of that strategy 
on each trial in a subsequent experiment. The dsyphoric participants showed 
stochastic dependence, just as the others had done without guidance, and 
the previously obtained deficit in (d-prime) recognition scores was now 
not found. 
These early experiments with Hardin provided a good set of examples 
of how low initiative on the part of dysphoric or depressed people could 
be compensated for by successful experimental control of attention. In an 
ongoing series of recognition experiments, Colleen Parks and I have been 
trying a different tack-one that seeks to take advantage of the tendency 
to attend to mood-congruent events. 
: 3. On Tests of Recognizing Emotional Material 
For people who are in depressed or dsyphoric states, mood-congruent 
memory is a fairly robust phenomenon (for reviews, see Gotlib, Roberts, & 
Gilboa, 1996; Williams et al., 1997). Depressed participants produce supe- 
rior recall for negative trait adjectives, for example, compared to their own 
recall of positive trait adjectives and sometimes compared to nondepressed 
recall of negative adjectives. Clearly in these paradigms, depression is not 
associated with problems in initiating or sustaining attention to mood- 
congruent materials. Parks and I are attempting to use this attentional 
tendency as a focusing device by providing emotional contexts for the 
neutral materials to be remembered later. If this method is successful, in 
the long run it will offer the extra advantage of solving a problem inherent 
in mood-congruent research designs. 
One of the methodological sticky points encountered by mood-congruent 
experiments has been the "materials" problem. These experiments typically 
are built around emotionally valenced nouns or adjectives. However, no 
matter how carefully one tries to balance positive and negative word lists 
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according to characteristics like concreteness, meaningfulness, and fre- 
quency, other differences between the lists cannot be ruled out. Researchers 
have often suspected that negatively toned words are better interrelated, 
for example. To address this problem, we have been trying to make neutral 
words emotional by manipulating how they are experienced during initial 
exposure. Nouns were selected for their emotional neutrality and then 
paired with adjectives such that each noun could be presented as an emo- 
tionally positive or negative pair (e.g., "flawless skin" or "slashed skin"; 
"warm cottage" or "gloomy cottage"). Lists were balanced on a number 
of dimensions, including pilot ratings for the emotional values of all pairs, 
and counterbalanced with the levels of the within-subjects factors in the 
design. Equal numbers of participants in each mood group experienced 
"skin7' (for example) in a positive sense, in a negative sense, as a single 
word in a separate study phase, and as a new word on the recognition test. 
In one of these experiments, we told the students that they were partici- 
pating in a memory experiment, but before it was to begin, we needed 
some ratings for materials to be used in future experiments. That was our 
cover story for phase 1, and it provided the rationale for exclusion instruc- 
tions on the test. During phase 1, 30 word pairs (in blocks of 5 positive or 
5 negative) were presented for 6 s each, and the participants were instructed 
to generate an image of themselves interacting with the event the pair 
described. The pair's presentation was followed by a rating scale, which 
they used to rate the emotional value of the image. The rating was self- 
paced. Thus, we believed that we gave participants ample opportunity to 
devote as much or as little attention to the pairs as they chose to do. 
The rating task was followed by the so-called memory experiment. In 
phase 2, 30 single nouns were presented for 1.5 s each. (Fifteen of those 
were "critical" nouns, from a list that was rotated through all conditions 
as part of the counterbalancing procedures.) Instructions for the "yeslno" 
recognition test alerted subjects about the need to exclude words from the 
rating task and endorse as recognized only those words they studied in the 
preceding phase. The test consisted of 90 trials: 15 nouns from positive 
pairs in phase 1,15 from negative pairs in phase 1,15 critical phase-2 nouns, 
15 critical new nouns, 15 phase-2 fillers, and 15 new fillers. (Fillers were 
similar to the other nouns but were not rotated through all the conditions.) 
On each test trial, a single noun was presented for 2000 ms, and during 
the last 750 ms it was accompanied by a row of asterisks underneath. The 
participants understood that they should not press the Y or N key until 
the asterisks appeared, and they were given 15 practice trials to become 
accustomed to this procedure. After the main test, the participants filled 
out a Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). They had been preselected accord- 
ing to scores on a classroom administration of that inventory, and only the 
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data from those participants whose scores remained in the same categories 
were analy~ed.~ 
Parks and I predicted that 2 s would be ample time to recruit the prior 
context and exclude the nouns from well-attended trials during phase I. If 
the dysphoric students had sustained attention and constructed distinctive 
images on the negative trials in particular, those nouns should have been 
more successfully excluded than nouns from the positive trials and as suc- 
cessfully excluded as were negative nouns by nondysphoric students. The 
mean percentages of yes responses are presented in Fig. 3. 
We first performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the number 
of yes responses from the so-called memory experiment. Mood group (dys- 
phoric versus nondysphoric) constituted the between-subjects factor and 
item type (phase-2 versus new critical nouns) the within-subjects fac- 
tor. The main effect of item type was obviously reliable [F  (1,30) = 213.3, 
MSE = 4 . 8 0 , ~  < .001]. Both the interaction with mood and its main effect 
were not reliable (Fs < 1.0). 
Next we evaluated differences in the number of exclusion errors (the 
number of yes responses) according to mood group and valence of 
the phase-1 material. Dysphoric participants made more errors overall 
[F (1,30) = 8.58, MSE = 7.46, p < .01]. This difference seemed greater for 
positive trials than for negative ones, although the interaction with valence 
was not reliable [F  (1,30) = 2.38, MSE = 3 . 1 8 , ~  > .lo]. Yet, the difference 
between mood groups in excluding nouns from negative trials was not 
reliable at the .05 level of significance, particularly when the baseline differ- 
ence was used as a covariate. In short, we have been somewhat successful 
in closing the dysphoria-related gap in memory for neutral materials by 
capitalizing on mood-congruent interests. This line of research continues. 
One other aspect to these results deserves mention: The absolute value 
of the difference in exclusion errors made to nouns from positive versus 
negative contexts was 1.1 on average in the nondysphoric condition, but 
3.0 in the dysphoric group [t(30) = 4.20, SE = 0 . 4 5 , ~  < .001]. The manipula- 
tion of valence clearly had a larger effect for the dysphoric students, if not 
always the same sort of effect; 10 participants made fewer exclusion errors 
on negative nouns, but 6 participants made fewer errors on positive nouns. 
Mood-incongruent memory would be produced if those students attempted 
mood repair by attending more carefully on the positive trials (see Gotlib 
et al., 1996). 
Participants were selected initially if they scored below 6 or above 9 on the BDI. The data 
from 7 participants were set aside and replaced, because the end-of-session scores did not 
fall in the same category. The ciata from 8 additional participants were replaced due to a variety 
of running errors (insufficient fluency in English, misunderstood instructions, interruptions by 
maintenance workers). Finally, the data from 16 participants in each mood group were ana- 
lyzed; they were equally distributed across the four counterbalancing conditions. 
Paula T. Hertel 
M o o d  G r o u p  
7 0 
Positive Negative  Phase 2 New 
Item Type 
Fig. 3. The mean percentage of words endorsed as studied by dysphoric and nondysphoric 
students. The words were made positive or negative by a phase-1 task, studied in phase 2, 
or newly presented on the test. "Yes" responses were appropriate only for phase-2 words 
(Hertel and Parks, in progress). 
4. On Tests o f  Prospective Memory 
With sufficient initiative or assistance from others, depressed people seek 
out psychotherapists to help with mood-repair efforts. Among the com- 
plaints presented to psychotherapists are difficulties with memory. What 
do people mean when they say they have trouble with memory? Certainly 
they do not mean that memory is failing them in spontaneous or automatic 
ways. If we are not aware that memory is operating-on those ubiquitous 
indirect tests of everyday life-we do not think to complaint about trouble 
with memory. Moreover, as discussed in an earlier section, depressed peo- 
ple's memories are probably not failing them in this respect. 
Sometimes when people complain about their memory they mean that 
they forget names. (Memory researchers are often asked for hints about 
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I ! how to remember names, probably because forgetting names can be embar- 
assing.) More likely, however, people mean that they forget to do things, 
because forgetting to do things can have important consequences. The field 
I of prospective memory is the study of memory for carrying out intentions 
I in the future, and it is an obvious domain for investigations of depression- 
' related deficits in self-initiated uses of memory. 
Einstein and McDaniel (e.g., 1990) conducted a number of experiments 
on prospective memory and aging. A useful distinction established by their 
[ 
work is the one between time-based and event-based prospective tasks. 
Event-based tasks essentially provide cues for carrying out the intention 
(the pill container placed by the coffee pot), whereas in time-based tasks 
the passage of time is the signal for the act (of taking a pill every 4 hours, 
for example). In particular, Einstein and McDaniel's older participants 
I have shown impaired prospective memory on time-based tasks, which re- 
quire more self-initiation than do event-based tasks. 
Depressed people have a lot in common cognitively with older people, 
who are also impaired in controlled uses of memory for past events (e.g., 
Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). Stephanie Rude and I anticipated that the similar- 
ity would be found in this prospective domain as well (see Rude, Hertel, 
Jarrold, Covich, & Hedlund, 1999). We recruited clinically depressed and 
nondepressed volunteers from the community and used procedures similar 
to those used by Einstein and McDaniel in their time-based condition. The 
participants were instructed to press the F1 key on the computer keyboard 
every 5 min while they were answering general-knowledge questions (a 
30-min task), and they could access a digital clock by pressing another 
key. We found a depression-related impairment in the number of prospec- 
tive responses and also in the number of times the clock was checked. As 
seen in Fig. 4, time monitoring increased in frequency toward the end of 
the 5-min interval to a greater extent for the nondepressed participants 
than for the depressed. (The dropoff in the fifth segment of the interval 
reflects the fact that the prospective response itself could be made at the 
end of that interval.) These results are quite compatible with an initiative 
account of depression-related or age-related deficits, as well as with other 
accounts that stress deficient control. The next step is to try to remediate 
this impairment by introducing a focusing manipulation. In the meantime, 
let's consider why such a manipulation might work by examining the possi- 
ble reasons for poor initiation in depressed states. 
In. The Role of Motivation in Memory Impairments 
The cognitive-initiative account of memory impairments is a general cogni- 
tive framework. By that I mean that it should apply to any situation or 
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Fig. 4. The mean number of times the clock was checked in each minute prior to the time 
for the prospective response. Means were computed across participants in each mood condition 
and across the six opportunities for the prospective response. (From a table in "Depression 
related impairments in prospective memory," by S. S .  Rude, P. T. Hertel, W. Jarold, J. 
Covich, & S. Hedlund, 1999, Cognition & Emotion, 13, p. 273. Copyright 0 1999 by Psychology 
Press Ltd.) reprinted by permission of Psychology Press Limited, Hove, UK. 
state that would occasion poor self-initiated processing, not just depressed 
mood. In fact, the notion of reduced initiative has been used by Craik 
(1986) to address age-related memory impairments. A separate issue is the 
question of why the account should apply to depressed people in the first 
place. As is suggested by the everday meaning of initiative, perhaps these 
difficulties are motivational in nature (see Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 
1989). Indeed, researchers have sometimes referred to the initiative frame- 
work as a motivational account (e.g., Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 
1993). Consider this description by Ellis, Ottoway, Varner, Becker, and 
Moore (1997, p. 132): "Individuals in a disruptive mood state may simply 
be less motivated or energized to perform well in demanding tasks, that 
is, they may lack sufficient initiative to perform the task adequately (e.g., 
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Hertel & Rude)." Plainly, the word initiative has been taken to mean 
either incentive or arousal, although we have never described memory 
impairments in those ways. However, the cognitive-initiative account can 
be conceptualized as motivational in two other ways. 
As is sometimes suspected with aging, the difficulty in self-initiation is 
potentially related to reduced activation in the frontal regions of the cortex 
(e.g., Henriques & Davidson, 1991), the areas understood as responsible 
for planning, monitoring, initiating, and sustaining attention. The extent of 
this neuropsychological basis for reduced initiative should vary with the 
severity of the depression (Johnson & Magaro, 1987). Furthermore, on 
neuropsychological grounds, reduced initiative in the control of attention 
might underlie depression-related difficulties in other goal-directed behav- 
iors, in addition to those related to remembering. The commonalities among 
the different meanings of the terms control and initiative, mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, can probably be attributed to their frontal roots. 
In that fundamental sense, the cognitive-initiative account does seem to 
be a motivational account of memory difficulties. 
Another motivational aspect of the initiative framework is quite different. 
Consider Simon's (1994) description of the relations among attention, mem- 
ory, and emotion: "Items in memory with which emotion is associated are, 
ceteris paribus, more easily aroused than other items and hence more capa- 
ble of directing attention or causing interruption of attention. They operate 
much like motives but are associated with perhaps less specific goals than 
motives usually are" (p. 19). In this sense, most approaches to depression 
and memory (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Williams et al., 1997) are motiva- 
tional. They generally assume that depressed people are motivated to attend 
to personal concerns-"to items in memory with which emotion is associ- 
ated." Task materials that are related to those concerns are attended and 
remembered, thereby producing mood-congruent memory, and those that 
are unrelated suffer from neglect while personal concerns preempt atten- 
tion. Like these other views, the initiative account is a motivational account 
in that it acknowledges that personal concerns and interests can divert 
attention that would otherwise be focused on the task at hand. Is there 
reason to believe that such diversions underlie impaired memory for neutral 
events? I conducted an experiment that addresses this question (Hertel, 
1998). 
This experiment had three phases: The first and last were close replica- 
tions of the materials and procedures used by Jacoby (1996). Word pairs 
(e.g., "building stone") were presented at a 2-s rate, and the participants 
read them aloud in anticipation of a later memory test. The form of the 
test was fragment completion on the second member of the pairs from phase 
1 (e.g., "building - to - e"), conducted according to process-dissociation 
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procedures. On half of the trials, inclusion instructions were given. The 
participants were told that they should complete the fragment with a word 
from phase 1 that was related to the context word ("building") or, if they 
could not remember such a word, they should complete the fragment with 
the first word that comes to mind that is related to the context word. On 
exclusion trials they were told to try to remember a word from phase 1 
that completes the fragment but not to use that word; instead they should 
use another word that fits the fragment and is related to the context word 
(e.g., "store"). By assuming that controlled and automatic uses of memory 
operate independently in this paradigm, we calculated estimates of each 
component. What we were most interested in were the estimates of the 
controlled component. Recall that we had previously shown dysphoria- 
related impairments in controlled reflection within a recognition paradigm 
(Hertel & Milan, 1994). 1 hoped to replicate this effect and, moreover, gain 
some insight about why it might occur. To do that, I used three versions 
of a second phase of the experiment, interspersed between the study and 
test phases. 
In the unconstrained version of phase 2, the experimenter fiddled with 
the computer and shuffled papers for 7 min, while the participants sat 
quietly and did nothing. At least they did nothing that the experimenters 
could observe; certainly, they were entitled to their thoughts. The point of 
using such a long interval was to invite the dysphoric participants to enter- 
tain the kind of thoughts that are often blamed for poor performance in 
laboratory memory tasks: automatic negative thoughts that Beck and others 
documented in the clinical literature (see Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emory, 
1979; Williams et al., 1997). Clearly, prior practice in entertaining these 
concerns during "free times" causes them to come to mind automatically 
during future unconstrained periods. Practice in attending makes the at- 
tended thought automatic (see Logan & Etherton, 1994). Once personal 
concerns come to mind, it should be difficult to dismiss them and control 
one's attention to the past during the memory test. The thoughts are simply 
more compelling or attention demanding than are the mundane events of 
the experiment. A difficulty for the researcher, however, is to determine 
if indeed these kinds of thoughts occur. If you ask the participants during 
the interval, you encourage the thoughts, and if you wait until later, you 
rely on memory and establish demand characteristics associated with the 
timing of the request (see Hertel, 1997; Parrott & Hertel, 1999). For these 
reasons, I chose to use two other conditions of the experiment as alternative 
models for what might have happened in the unconstrained condition. 
Only three kinds of cognitive activities were possible during the 7 min. 
The participants could have entertained no thoughts at all, self-focused 
thoughts, or other-focused thoughts. (Admittedly, various combinations 
were also possible.) I eschewed the condition of no thoughts at all, because it 
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seemed like an impossible outcome to pull off experimentally. To encourage 
self-focused or neutral (other-focused) thoughts, I slightly modified phrases 
borrowed from Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). Their neutral phrases 
refer to geographic locations and objects (e.g., "the shape of the continent 
of Africa"). Although their self-focused phrases (e.g., "my character and 
who I strive to be") are not inherently negative, they have been shown to 
encourage ruminative thoughts in depressed and dysphoric participants. 
In each of the separate phase-2 conditions-self-focused and neutral- 
dysphoric and nondysphoric participants were instructed to read each 
phrase, form an idea of the meaning of the phrase, and then rate the clarity 
of that idea. They performed this rating task for 7 min. If the self-focused 
phrases encouraged rumination in the dysphoric group, I expected to see 
a corresponding impairment on estimates of the controlled component of 
memory on the subsequent test. The neutral condition was an important 
control for the nature of the thoughts. Frontal hypoactivation or some 
other cause of generalized distractibility might make it difficult to focus 
attention on the past. After all, it was possible to perform the test by relying 
on more automatic influences of memory. 
Figure 5 shows the mean estimates of control in this experiment. The 
impairment in the unconstrained condition was reliable. It was mimicked 
by the pattern obtained from participants in the self-focused condition, and 
the difference was eliminated in the condition in which the participants 
thought about other matters. A very similar pattern also obtained when 
these data were reanalyzed by using the extended measurement model of 
Buchner, Erdfelder, and Vaterrodt-Pliinnecke (1995; see Hertel & Meiser, 
in press). For dysphoric students, then, the self-focused condition provided 
a good model for the deficit obtained in the unconstrained condition. Of 
course, we cannot be sure of this interpretation, given the fact that the 
same pattern could be produced by different processes. However, we do 
know that a simple mood-change account probably is not sufficient. Mood 
ratings at the end of the test were no more extreme in the self-focused 
condition than in the neutral condition (nor were the scores on the BDI). It 
is also important to realize that more fundamental motivational difficulties 
might characterize the impairments of clinically depressed patients- 
perhaps the sort that are associated with frontal hypoactivation. These 
issues merit further research, perhaps more creatively conceived, aimed at 
the understanding of the processes responsible for poor initiation and con- 
trol in depressed and dysphoric moods. 
IV. Comparisons and Conclusions 
In addition to a shared motivational flavor, the cognitive-initiative ap- 
proach is compatible in other respects with earlier conceptualizations of 
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Fig. 5. The mean estimate of the controlled component of memory in a fragment- 
completion test, following an unconstrained interval, a self-focused rating task, or a neutral 
rating task. Adapted from "The Relationship between Rumination and Impaired Memory 
in Dysphoric Moods," by P. T. Hertel, 1998, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, p. 170. 
Copyright O 1998 by the American Psychological Association. 
depression-related impairments (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979; Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981; Wil- 
liams et al., 1988). In the main, these earlier approaches employed spatial 
metaphors and put forward the notion that competing thoughts occupy 
capacity or tie up resources that the depressed or dysphoric person might 
otherwise use to perform a cognitively demanding task. In contrast, my 
collaborators and I employed procedural metaphors and argued that capac- 
ity metaphors are not sufficient to explain the entire pattern of depression- 
related performance. 
Essentially, there are three types of phenomena that are difficult to 
explain by using a capacity-based metaphor alone. First, in the experiment 
just described, the elimination of the opportunity to ruminate also elimi- 
nated the impairment in controlled use of memory (Hertel, 1998); capacity 
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accounts rarely permit this degree of flexibility. Second, a deficit has been 
found on the simple task of perceptual identification (Hertel, 1994), and 
the condition of initial exposure that produced the deficit was the less 
resource-demanding task: the task of rating curvature, not the task of 
rating emotionality. Third is evidence that external control can sometimes 
compensate for deficiencies in less-structured situations, even when the 
task is resource-intensive (Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 1991a,b). 
Thus, the contribution of the initiative framework has been to emphasize 
the importance of attentional control during unstructured conditions. It is 
important to know whether such control is disruptive, irrelevant, or benefi- 
cial to performance on the memory task. When it is beneficial, external 
mean can be used to focus attention appropriately. Whether guidance 
remediates depression-related impairments, however, depends on a careful 
analysis of the cognitive procedures that are instrumental to successful 
performance. Consider a series of experiments by Ellis at al. (1997) on the 
effects of "depressed" mood inductions on the detection of contradictions 
in text. 
Ellis et al. found that students who had received the "depressing" version 
of a mood-induction procedure detected fewer contradictions than did those 
in the neutral condition, even after the students had been alerted to the 
possible presence of contradictions. The authors saw the warning about 
possible contradictions as a focusing manipulation and interpreted the mood 
effect for participants so warned as evidence counter to an initiative account. 
Although the search for boundary conditions on the account is important, 
the justification for Ellis et al.'s interpretation is questionable. First, the 
experimental induction of depressed mood does not always serve as a 
reasonable model for naturally occurring depressed or dysphoric mood 
states (see Hertel & Rude, 1991b; Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Second, the 
instructions to search for contradictions was given right after the "de- 
pressed" participants-and not those in the neutral condition-had been 
encouraged to entertain any thoughts that came to mind as part of their 
induction procedure. Differential carry-over effects of distraction possibly 
interfered with the control intended by the warning. The third point is the 
more general point about the adequacy of experimental control. 
Consider that evidence for remediation of dysphoria- or depression- 
related impairments has been based on manipulations that guided partici- 
pants' processing quite specifically. For example, Hertel and Hardin (1990) 
inferred that nondysphoric participants' stochastic dependence of homo- 
phone recognition on prior spelling reflected the use of an attentional 
strategy at the time of the test; we therefore guided the dysphoric partici- 
pants' use of that strategy, trial-by-trial, and remediated the recognition 
deficit. Hertel and Rude (1991a,b) surmised that the constraints on attention 
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during initial exposure to target materials were lax; we therefore tightened 
the demands of the orienting task by requiring sustained attention to the 
targets and thereby remediated the deficit in subsequent recall. In contrast, 
the pretask instructions given by Ellis et al. (1997) might not have served 
the purpose of guiding participants to engage in beneficial procedures 
during the task itself. In short, "depression-induced" participants were 
encouraged to let their minds wander, and attention was not focused by 
specific response requirements as the task proceeded. The cognitive- 
initiative account-or any other account that stresses the attention-directing 
aspects of task requirements-cannot be ruled out on the basis of the 
failure to focus attention sufficiently. 
Understanding the specific procedures that contribute to successful task 
performance is, of course, a very general goal in cognitive psychology. The 
point of studying effects of mood or relationships to clinical syndromes is 
not only to achieve an understanding of the state or syndrome, but also to 
determine whether our theoretical frameworks can accomodate emotion- 
related phenomena. There is little reason to believe that these goals should 
be easily achieved, given the difficulty of understanding the level of proce- 
dural specificity that underlies task performance (see Kolers & Roediger, 
1984). Thus far, my colleagues and I have shown that deficiencies in deliber- 
ate memory associated with depressed and dysphoric states can be under- 
stood in terms of attentional control. We know that personal concerns 
can occupy attention and interfere with the use of procedures that would 
otherwise be self-initiated. Truly successful remediation of impairments, 
through guiding the use of beneficial procedures, has been achieved in only 
two experimental paradigms: one that focused attention sufficiently during 
initial exposure and one that directed the use of recognition strategies. 
Clear failures to gain experimental control have also been demonstrated. 
For example, Hertel and Milan (1994) demonstrated that dysphoria- 
related impairments in the controlled component of recognition memory 
could not be remediated simply by reinstating contextual cues at the time 
of testing. However, the discovery that a particular attention-focusing 
procedure is inadequate should not discourage the search for better 
means. 
In general, investigators of depression-related impairments must move 
beyond the mere assertion that attention is diverted by personal concerns 
to an understanding of the specific procedures involved in producing and 
remediating the impairments. A proper understanding of a phenomenon 
can be shown by its experimental reduction or elimination. To do that in 
the case of cognitive impairments in depression, we need to know the 
nature of the "something" that someone has done without being told. 
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